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There is a large body of evidence of apparently spontaneous mim-
icry in humans. This phenomenon has been described as “auto-
matic imitation” and attributed to a mirror neuron system, but
there is little direct evidence that it is involuntary rather than in-
tentional. Cook et al. supplied the ﬁrst such evidence in a unique
strategic game design that gave all subjects a pecuniary incentive
to avoid imitation [Cook R, Bird G, Lünser G, Huck S, Heyes C (2012)
Proc Biol Sci 279(1729):780–786]. Subjects played Rock-Paper-
Scissors repeatedly in matches between ﬁxed pairs, sometimes
with one and sometimes with both subjects blindfolded. The fre-
quency of draws in the blind-blind condition was at chance, but in
the blind-sighted condition it was signiﬁcantly higher, suggesting
automatic imitation had occurred. Automatic imitation would raise
novel issues concerning how strategic interactions are modeled in
game theory and social science; however, inferring automatic imi-
tation requires signiﬁcant incentives to avoid it, and subjects’ incen-
tives were less than 3 US cents per 60-game match. We replaced
Cook et al.’s Rock-Paper-Scissors with a Matching Pennies game,
which allows far stronger incentives to avoid imitation for some
subjects, with equally strong incentives to imitate for others. Our
results are important in providing evidence of automatic imitation
against signiﬁcant incentives. That some of our subjects had incen-
tives to imitate also enables us clearly to distinguish intentional
responding from automatic imitation, and we ﬁnd evidence that
both occur. Thus, our results strongly conﬁrm the occurrence of
automatic imitation, and illuminate the way that automatic and in-
tentional processes interact in a strategic context.
zero-sum game | face-to-face strategic interaction | neuroeconomics
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that observing anaction increases the probability that the observer will im-
mediately perform the same action, even when the observer has
not been instructed to imitate and does not obtain any reward
from doing so (1–5). This phenomenon has been described as
“automatic imitation” and attributed to the operation of mirror
neurons (6–8). Each of these neurons, ﬁrst discovered in the
monkey premotor and parietal cortex, responds both to the sight
and execution of a given action (9–11). Since the discovery of
mirror neurons in the monkey, considerable evidence has been
amassed suggesting that humans also have a mirror neuron sys-
tem (12, 13).
Until recently there was little direct evidence to support the
view that automatic imitation is involuntary rather than strategic
or intentional. Even evidence of imitation in infants and non-
human animals has been construed as intentional (14), and ex-
perimental techniques that could reliably distinguish automatic
from intentional imitation have been hard to ﬁnd (15). Cook
et al. supplied the ﬁrst direct evidence in a unique strategic game
design that gave human subjects a pecuniary incentive to avoid
imitation (16). Their subjects played Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
games repeatedly in matches between ﬁxed pairs, sometimes
with one and sometimes with both subjects blindfolded. There
was a money reward for winning each 60-game match but not for
losing or drawing, so that imitation (which produced a draw)
tended to lower a subject’s expected payoff. The frequency of
draws in the blind-blind condition was as expected at chance, but
in the blind-sighted condition it was signiﬁcantly higher, sug-
gesting that there was an imitation effect, and that it was auto-
matic rather than intentional.
Automatic imitation would raise important issues concerning
how strategic interactions are modeled in game theory and social
science. In theoretical analyses of strategic interactions, it is al-
most universally assumed that the timing of decisions is exoge-
nous; timing inﬂuences players’ decisions only via its effect on
their information about previous decisions; and all decisions are
conscious. Timing can make a big difference if some decisions
are unconscious when made sequentially under time pressure.
Consider a one-stage Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but possibly
with asynchronous decisions to cooperate or defect. In a stan-
dard analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players respond to
their incentives by defecting, and the outcome is worse for both
than if both cooperate; furthermore, because defecting is a
dominant strategy (better for a player no matter what the other
player decides), the conclusion would remain the same even with
asynchronous decisions. If, by contrast, decisions are asynchro-
nous, and this creates sufﬁcient time pressure for the second
mover that she or he unconsciously imitates the ﬁrst-mover’s
decision, then a ﬁrst-mover who understands the principles of
the second-mover’s behavior in effect faces a choice between two
imitative outcomes: “defect, defect,” the standard Nash equi-
librium outcome; and “cooperate, cooperate,” an outcome that
becomes feasible when the second-mover’s unconscious decision
overrides her or his incentive to defect, even though it is not an
equilibrium in the standard analysis. A rational ﬁrst-mover will of
course choose to cooperate, knowing that it will induce the sec-
ond-mover to cooperate, yielding an outcome that is better for
both players. The implications for the optimal design of rela-
tionship structures, or for predicting the consequences of existing
structures, may be very important.[Asynchronous timing can
foster coordination even without observability of earlier deci-
sions (17, 18). However, unlike the automatic imitation of earlier
decisions studied here, such timing effects must be intentional.
The novelty of our analysis is that it implies: (i) choice might in
some circumstances be involuntary, (ii) involuntary choices can
override the incentive constraints that in theory prevent good
outcomes in our Prisoner’s Dilemma and related examples, and
(iii) involuntary and conscious choices might interact in novel
ways in settings with nontrivial time-sequencing. This implication
enhances the value of experimentally separating intentional from
automatic imitation.]
However, the evidence reported by Cook et al. (16) is not de-
cisive for two reasons. First, inferring automatic imitation requires
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signiﬁcant incentives to avoid it and, as explained below, close
examination of Cook et al.’s methods reveals that their subjects
were given only very weak incentives to avoid imitation: little
more than one British penny, less than 3 US cents per 60-game
match. Second, a subsequent study using a similar procedure
failed to replicate the results of the Cook et al. experiment (19).
Testing more rigorously for automatic imitation in a strategic
context, we replaced RPS with a Matching Pennies game, which
allows far stronger incentives to avoid imitation for some sub-
jects, with equally strong incentives to imitate for others. We also
conducted a more ﬁne-grained analysis of players’ behavior, in-
vestigating the effects of experience on automatic imitation. Our
results are important in providing evidence of automatic imita-
tion against signiﬁcant incentives, greatly strengthening Cook
et al.’s inference. That some of our subjects had incentives to
imitate also enables us clearly to distinguish intentional respond-
ing from automatic imitation, and we ﬁnd evidence that both
occur. Thus, our results strongly conﬁrm the occurrence of au-
tomatic imitation, and illuminate the way that automatic and
intentional processes interact in a strategic context.
To explain and motivate our modiﬁcations of the procedure
used by Cook et al., we need ﬁrst to examine their design more
closely. Cook et al.’s subjects repeatedly played an RPS game,
which Cook et al. described as follows (16): “In RPS, two players
each present one of three alternative hand gestures. Each player
must make either ‘rock’ (a closed ﬁst), ‘paper’ (an open hand), or
‘scissors’ (index and middle ﬁnger parted) gestures, typically fol-
lowing a count of three. A paper gesture beats a rock gesture;
scissors beats paper; and rock beats scissors. If both players make
the same gesture, the round is drawn (Table 1). In this zero-sum
game, where one player’s victory (+1) results in the other play-
er’s defeat (−1), the only Nash equilibrium (where each player
behaves optimally given what all others do) is in mixed strategies.
Regardless of which action one player chooses, there would al-
ways be one speciﬁc action for the other player that ensures
a win, and vice versa. This ‘best-response structure’ inherent in
RPS ensures that players can only achieve optimal outcomes if
they avoid imitating each other.” (Emphasis in original.)
Cook et al.’s subjects were randomly grouped into triads, with
two of the three playing the game at any given time and the third
acting as umpire. In the main condition, one player was blind-
folded and the other was sighted. Although the umpire “re-
quired” players to present their gestures simultaneously, there
was a naturally occurring asynchrony between the onsets of the
two players’ gestures, with one sometimes presenting slightly
earlier than the other. If it was the blindfolded player who pre-
sented earlier, the sighted player might have been able to ob-
serve the blindfolded player’s gesture in time to respond to it.
However, Cook et al. argued (16) that “response asynchronies
long enough to allow intentional response selection would have
been detected and disqualiﬁed by the umpire.” Even so, when
evaluating the strength of incentives to avoid imitation in their
design, Cook et al. appeared to assume that players who saw
their opponents’ gestures in time to respond could “achieve
optimal outcomes,” (e.g., by playing rock against an observed
scissors, yielding a payoff of 1) (Table 1). However, if intentional
response selection was not feasible, then a player who saw her or
his opponent’s gestures in time could at best avoid imitation but
not otherwise select among gestures. In that case, a more plau-
sible alternative to imitation is not an “optimal outcome,” such
as rock against an observed scissors, but rather rock and paper
each with probability 1 in 2 against scissors, yielding expected
payoff 0, the same as the payoff from imitation.
Although this argument suggests that Cook et al.’s players had
no incentive at all to avoid imitation, a subtle “tournament”
feature of their reward structure did in fact give players a small
incentive. Players did not receive their payoffs for each game or
a random subset of games, as is standard in game experiments.
Instead, the players were paid an additional £2.50 for each 60-
game match won, with no payment for matches lost or drawn.
(The players were also paid a £5 show-up fee that did not depend
on performance. The experiments were run between September
2007 and November 2008, with £1 ranging from $1.54 to $2.02.)
Assuming, for simplicity, that players’ expected numbers of wins
and losses in a game or a match were equal, the fact that they
were paid nothing for drawn matches made their expected ad-
ditional winnings per match £1.25 times the probability that the
match was not drawn. Under standard assumptions, the proba-
bility of drawing a match decreases with the probability of a draw
in any given game in the match. Thus, even though imitation
does not reduce the expected payoff in a given game of a subject
who can avoid imitation but not otherwise select among gestures,
Cook et al.’s payment scheme creates an incentive to avoid im-
itation. However, with 60 games per match, the probability of
a drawn match is very low, and the incentive to avoid imitation is
correspondingly very weak. Cook et al. estimated from a sub-
sidiary, ﬁlmed treatment that a sighted subject could observe her
or his opponent’s gesture in time to respond automatically in
17.2% of games. For their payment scheme, for any realistic
observation rate (say, less than 40%), the difference between the
expected payoffs of responding optimally to all observed gestures
and responding randomly is only about £0.0125 per match, less
than 3 US cents.
To learn whether Cook et al.’s inference that imitation is au-
tomatic holds up under more substantial incentives, we modify
their design, replacing their RPS game with a Matching Pennies
game and rewarding players’ performance game by game
(avoiding subtle tournament incentives).
Our subjects, like Cook et al.’s, were randomly grouped into
triads, with two of the three playing the game at any given
time and the third acting as umpire. In our implementation of
Matching Pennies, each player starts with one hand in a neutral
position, START in Fig. 1. Players are then asked to show either
an OPEN-HAND or a CLOSED-HAND gesture as in Fig. 1,
immediately following a count of three by the umpire. The
subject designated as Player 1 in Table 2 wins if her or his and
the other subject’s gestures are the same, and Player 2 wins if the
gestures differ (in either way).
Matching Pennies is a zero-sum game, where (as in RPS) one
player’s win (yielding payoff 1) results in the other’s loss (payoff
−1), but (unlike in RPS) draws are impossible. The game has no
Nash equilibria (combinations of strategies in which each player
behaves optimally given what the other does) in pure (unran-
domized) strategies: If one player chose a pure strategy (i.e.,
chose one of the two gestures with probability 1), the second
player would have a winning choice and that choice would then
make the ﬁrst player’s choice suboptimal. There is a unique Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies, with each player playing each of
her or his gestures with probability 1 in 2, so that playing each
gesture with probability 1 in 2 is also an optimal response for her
or his opponent.
The uniqueness of winning gestures and the fact that there are
only two gestures in Matching Pennies allows us to give some
players strong incentives to avoid imitation within the game (as
Table 1. RPS game, where (0,0) denotes a drawn round, (1,−1)
denotes a win for player 1, and (−1,1) denotes a win for player 2
Player 2
Rock Paper Scissors
Player 1 Rock 0,0 −1,1 1,−1
Paper 1,−1 0,0 −1,1
Scissors −1,1 1,−1 0,0
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opposed to the match), even if it is possible only for a subject to
resist imitating, rather than to select among nonimitative ges-
tures. This factor allows a far stronger test of the hypothesis that
imitation is automatic. Matching Pennies also allows us to give
other players comparable incentives to imitate, and thereby, in
contrast with Cook et al.’s design, the opportunity to ﬁnd out
whether incentives can enhance imitation (i.e., to detect intentional
imitation as well as automatic imitation in a strategic context).
Thus, our experimental procedure was designed to mimic
Cook et al.’s RPS implementation with three major exceptions.
First, instead of asking subjects to make rock, paper, or scissors
gestures, we required them to open or close their hand. Cook
et al. observed (16) “variability in the salience and distinctiveness
of the [RPS] gestures relative to the clenched ﬁst starting posi-
tion,” which may have led to their ﬁnding that the imitation ef-
fect was strongest for the scissors gesture, weaker for rock, and
absent for the paper gesture. In contrast, a number of previous
studies, in which there were no incentives to avoid imitation,
have reported substantial automatic imitation effects for hand
opening and closing (4, 5). Second, the critical comparison in the
study by Cook et al. was between games in which one player was
sighted (and therefore subject to automatic imitation) and in
which both players were blindfolded (and therefore immune to
automatic imitation). In contrast, although our subjects were also
blindfolded in half of their games, the critical comparison was
between the frequency of matching gestures (or of wins) pro-
duced by sighted players and chance level. Blindfolded subjects
merely presented the gestures that may or may not have been
imitated. The frequency of matching responses (and of wins) in
blindfolded subjects was necessarily the complement of the fre-
quency of matching responses (and of wins) in their sighted
opponents. Third, to ﬁnd out whether subjects can learn to resist
automatic imitation, our analysis compared players’ behavior in
earlier and later games. Psychological research suggests that,
through learning, incentives to match and to mismatch could
change the way in which players perceive and react to their
opponents’ gestures, or even provide a “teaching signal” that
transforms the core mechanisms of automatic imitation (15, 20).
As in Cook et al.’s experiment, each of our subjects received
£5 for participating, independent of performance. Unlike in
Cook et al.’s experiment, each player received an additional 10p
per game won, but no further payment for matches won, drawn,
or lost. Thus, a subject who won half of the 160 games she or he
played would earn an additional £8. If a sighted subject could
observe her or his opponent’s gesture in time to respond 17.2%
of the time, as Cook et al. estimated, the difference between the
expected payoffs of responding optimally in all such games and
responding randomly is £1.38 per match, more than 100 times
larger than in Cook et al.’s design. Over a subject’s eight matches
in our hour-long experiment, the difference is £11.01, or ap-
proximately $17 at the $1.55 exchange rate in December 2011,
when we ran our experiments.
Methods
Our subjects were recruited using Online Recruitment System for Economic
Experiments (21) and included 54 healthy students (21 females), almost all of
whom started studying at Oxford University in 2010 or 2011. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive to the purpose of the exper-
iment, although some had presumably studied game theory. The study was
approved by the Nufﬁeld Centre for Experimental Social Sciences Ethics
committee and performed in accordance with the ethical standards set out
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. Subjects gave informed consent. The
experiment took place at the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences at
Nufﬁeld College, Oxford, in a well-lit room. Data were collected over ﬁve
sessions, each lasting ∼60 min.
Detailed instructions were presented to subjects in written handouts at the
start of the session. The instructions were then read aloud, giving subjects the
opportunity for questions. Using the images in Fig. 1, players were also
shown before the start of the experiment what was required in terms of
gesture delivery.
Recall that our subjects, like Cook et al.’s, were randomly grouped into
triads, with two of the three playing the game at any given time and the
third acting as umpire. There were a total of 18 triads. Within each triad,
subjects were randomly assigned labels X, Y, or Z. The members of each triad
were required to play a total of 12 rounds of games, each consisting of 20
games of Matching Pennies. In the ﬁrst series of four rounds, series 1 in
Table 3, the players were X and Y; in series 2 the players were X and Z; and
in series 3 the players were Y and Z. In each round one player was “sighted”
and the other blindfolded, with these roles alternating as indicated in
Table 3. Each series was preceded by three unpaid practice trials, during
which both players were sighted. In each series the triad member who was
not a player served as the umpire, recording each game’s gestures and
outcomes on a paper scoring sheet and announcing them so that the
blindfolded player had the same information as the sighted player. Umpires
were asked to ensure that blindfolded players were unable to see their
opponent and that players were facing each other throughout each round,
to prevent deliberately delayed gesture execution, to note any violations of
the rules, and to require players to replay any games in which violations
were noted. (The umpire ordered a replay in 6.24% of the games.)
Results
Overall, players executed the OPEN-HAND gesture in 50.01%
of the rounds and the CLOSED-HAND gesture in 49.99%.
Pairwise t tests conﬁrm that players executed the gestures with
comparable frequencies in each of the four conditions: blind-
folded vs. sighted, (P = 0.895) and incentive to match vs. to
mismatch (P = 0.339). Note, however, that for the purpose of
signiﬁcance testing, neither the data from individual participants
nor player pairings can be treated as independent. A player’s
matches (or mismatches) in Matching Pennies are perfectly cor-
related with her or his opponent’s matches (or mismatches), and
a given subject’s idiosyncrasies could inﬂuence the outcomes of
the two of the three pairings within her or his triad in which she or
he played. In the remaining comparisons, we therefore treat the
data from each triad as a single independent observation.
Table 4 summarizes the matching and win frequencies for
sighted players. Automatic imitation should increase matching
Fig. 1. The START (A) position and the OPEN HAND (B) and CLOSED HAND (C) gestures.
Table 2. Matching Pennies game, where (1,−1) denotes a win
for player 1 (who wins by matching the other player’s gesture)
and (−1,1) denotes a win for player 2 (who wins by mismatching)
Player 2
Open hand Closed hand
Player 1 Open hand 1,−1 −1,1
Closed hand −1,1 1,−1
























frequencies above chance for the sighted player independently of
the matching incentives. The appropriate test is therefore a one-
tailed t test of the null-hypothesis of frequencies equal chance
against the alternative hypothesis of frequencies above chance
(>50%). Sighted players match their opponents’ gestures more
frequently than random whether they have an incentive to match
or an incentive to mismatch (one-tailed t test P = 0.032). Sighted
players therefore win more often over their blindfolded oppo-
nents when they have an incentive to match, and are at a slight
disadvantage when they have an incentive to mismatch. How-
ever, the frequency of matches is only signiﬁcantly higher than
chance for sighted players with an incentive to match (one-tailed
t test P = 0.048). It is not signiﬁcant for sighted players with an
incentive to mismatch (one-tailed t test P = 0.29).
Although Table 4’s aggregate matching frequencies may make
it seem that there is no signiﬁcant evidence of automatic imita-
tion, in our design the correct inference is more subtle and
depends on the distinction between automatic and intentional
responses. Intentional and automatic responses work in the same
direction when the sighted player has an incentive to match, but
they work in opposite directions, partly offsetting each other,
when the sighted player has an incentive to mismatch. The rel-
ative frequencies of intentional and automatic imitation can be
estimated from the matching frequencies in Table 4 by com-
paring them under different incentive conditions. Although these
estimates ignore the issue of statistical signiﬁcance, to which we
return below, they suggest that there is a substantial frequency of
automatic imitation, and probably some intentional imitation
as well.
Formally, let p be the frequency that in a given game, the
blindfolded subject presents sufﬁciently earlier to enable the
sighted subject to respond (imitate or counter-imitate) in-
tentionally; let q be the frequency that the blindfolded subject
presents sufﬁciently earlier to enable the sighted subject to re-
spond, but only automatically; and let 1 – p – q be the frequency
with which the sighted subject cannot imitate or counter-imitate
either intentionally or automatically. Suppose that intentional
responses follow incentives, automatic responses imitate the
opponent’s gesture without regard to incentives, and subjects
otherwise choose gestures randomly. Then sighted subjects with
incentives to match should match their opponents’ gestures with
frequency p × 1 + q × 1 + (1 − p − q) × 0.5 = 0.5 + p/2 + q/2 and
sighted subjects with incentives to mismatch should match their
opponents’ gestures with frequency p × 0 + q × 1 + (1 − p − q) ×
0.5 = 0.50 − p/2 + q/2. The difference between these two fre-
quencies is an estimate of p. (Win frequencies contain the same
information and could also be used to estimate p.) Given an
estimate of p, either observed matching frequency yields an es-
timate of q.
Based on Table 4’s matching frequencies, p = 52.13–50.69% =
1.44% and q = 2(52.13–50.00%) – p = 2.82%. This result sug-
gests that intentional responses (imitation and counter-imita-
tion) occurred at a nonnegligible rate, but were only half as
frequent as automatic ones. The prevalence of automatic over
intentional imitation explains why sighted players are at a slight
disadvantage when they have an incentive to mismatch.
Note that our calibrated estimate of p + q = 4.26% is only
a quarter of Cook et al.’s estimate of p + q = q = 17.2%, which
was based on videotape observation of response asynchronies.
(Because Cook et al. did not separate intentional from automatic
imitation, their estimate of q is directly comparable to our esti-
mate of p + q.) This result suggests that with two response
options (open or closed), rather than three (rock, paper, scis-
sors), and therefore less variation in decision time, our subjects
responded simultaneously in a higher proportion of trials. De-
spite this increase in response synchrony, we are able to detect
both automatic and intentional imitation.
We can obtain direct estimates of p and q by performing probit
regressions on the likelihood that the sighted player would
choose a closed gesture (1) or an open gesture (0), conditioning
on the gesture of the opponent (closed or open), as well as an
interaction between the gesture of the opponent and the players’
incentives to match or mismatch. The coefﬁcient corresponding
to the opponent’s gesture captures the automatic imitation effect
(q in our calibration above). The coefﬁcient corresponding to the
interaction of the opponent’s gesture and the incentives captures
the intentional effect (p). We use data at the individual game
level, which allows us to control for player ﬁxed-effects and look
for effects of timing and experience. All SEs are clustered at the
pair level. To look for effects of timing and experience, we ran
such regressions not only for the full sample, but also splitting
the sample into games played early (games 1–10) in a pairing and
late (games 11–20), and then further splitting the sample into
games played early in a pairing and late, interacted with whether
Table 3. Sequence of 12 rounds played by each triad
Series Triad
Series 1: player X vs. player Y; X wins if gestures do
not match; Y wins if gestures match
Player X blindfolded, player Y sighted
Player X sighted, player Y blindfolded
Player X blindfolded, player Y sighted
Player X sighted, player Y blindfolded
Series 2: player X vs. player Z; X wins if gestures
match; Z wins if gestures do not match
Player X blindfolded, player Z sighted
Player X sighted, player Z blindfolded
Player X blindfolded, player Z sighted
Player X sighted, player Z blindfolded
Series 3: player Y vs. player Z; Y wins if gestures do
not match; Z wins if gestures match
Player Y blindfolded, player Z sighted
Player Y sighted, player Z blindfolded
Player Y blindfolded, player Z sighted
Player Y sighted, player Z blindfolded
Table 4. Matching and winning frequencies
Matching frequency (P value) Win frequency (P value)
Sighted with incentive to match 52.13% (0.048) 52.13% (0.05)
Sighted with incentive to mismatch 50.69% (0.29) 49.31% (0.29)
The P values correspond to a one-tailed t test (H0: frequency = 50%, HA: frequency > 50%).
4 of 6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1209981110 Belot et al.
the pairing was in an early (rounds 1, 2) or late (rounds 3, 4)
round in the experiment. The null hypothesis here is p = 0 and
q = 0, tested against the alternative hypotheses p > 0 and q > 0,
respectively. The appropriate tests are again one-tailed t tests.
The results of the probit regressions are reported in Table 5
and Fig. 2. As indicated in the central panel of Fig. 2, these
results provide compelling evidence of automatic imitation in
games 1–10 (i.e., the ﬁrst 10 games played against each oppo-
nent), and of intentional behavior, responsive to incentives, in
games 11–20 (i.e., in the last 10 games played against each op-
ponent). More speculatively, the right-hand side of Fig. 2 sug-
gests that the ascendency of intentional responding over
automatic imitation between earlier (games 1–10) and later
(games 11–20) games occurs initially in rounds 1 and 2, when
each player has their ﬁrst experience of the matching and non-
matching incentives. Automatic imitation appears to be restored
to some extent in the earlier games of rounds 3 and 4, and then
to be replaced almost entirely by intentional responding in the
later games of rounds 3 and 4. Overall, the split-sample regres-
sions show that Fig. 2’s full-sample effects are driven mainly by
games played early in a pairing.
Discussion
In games such as Matching Pennies and RPS, players are for-
mally required to present their gestures simultaneously, but ab-
solute simultaneity in every game is not possible in practice.
Following Cook et al. (16), who made direct recordings of ges-
ture asynchronies, we inferred through the above calibration of
p and q that one of the players frequently presented her or his
gesture slightly earlier than the other. When it was the blind-
folded player who presented earlier, automatic imitation, or even
in some cases an intentional response may have been feasible for
the sighted player. Our results indicate that sighted players of
Matching Pennies exhibit a signiﬁcant tendency toward auto-
matic imitation of their opponent’s gestures, even when such
imitation goes against strong incentives; but they also exhibit
a smaller but still signiﬁcant tendency toward intentional
responses, either imitation or counter-imitation depending on
incentives. Furthermore, our results indicate that whereas au-
tomatic imitation dominates in earlier games, this tendency is
largely superseded by intentional responding in games played
later in the series.
Our ﬁndings are in accord with those of Cook et al. (16), and
are inconsistent with a recent study challenging the view that
automatic imitation occurs in strategic contexts (19). The latter
study, by Aczel, Bago and Foldes, used a RPS procedure similar
to that of Cook et al., but failed to ﬁnd a higher frequency of
draws when one player was sighted than when both players were
blindfolded. Our study suggests that this failure to replicate
Cook et al.’s result is likely to be because of two factors. First, in
the Cook et al. study subjects produced the three gestures with
equal frequency, but in the Aczel et al. (19) study the scissors
gesture was produced signiﬁcantly more often than either paper
or scissors. Second, in contrast with Cook et al., Aczel et al.
required their subjects to “bob”; before gesture delivery in each
game, the subject had to move her or his ﬁst down and then back
up toward the chest in time to the umpire’s count of three. This
bobbing requirement is likely to have reduced very substantially
the number of games in which one player presented her or his
gesture earlier than the other, and therefore the opportunities
for automatic imitation. By showing that automatic imitation
occurs against strong ﬁnancial incentives—the costs of automatic
imitation were more than 100-times larger in our study than in
the experiment by Cook et al.—the results of the present study
provide truly compelling evidence that automatic imitation
occurs in strategic contexts.
Our results are also unique in showing that experience with
matching and nonmatching incentives can enable players to re-
sist the “irrational” tendency toward automatic imitation. Recall
that in earlier games players showed automatic imitation, and in
later games their behavior was responsive to incentives. This
result suggests that learning occurred in the earlier games. For
example, players could have learned to focus on their opponent’s
gesture when they had an incentive to match, and to avoid
looking at their opponent’s gesture when they had an incentive
to mismatch. This variation in attention to the opponent’s ges-
ture would enable automatic imitation to boost performance in
the matching condition, and prevent automatic imitation from
interfering with performance in the nonmatching condition. Al-
ternatively, experience with the matching and nonmatching
incentives could have had a more profound effect on the psy-
chological and neural mechanisms that control automatic imi-
tation. A substantial body of evidence suggests that mirror
neurons are motor neurons (cells that were originally involved
only in the production of actions) that are linked in an excitatory
way to visual neurons that encode the same body movement
(cells that were originally involved only in perception of the body
movement), and that the visual and motor neurons become
linked, and thereby produce a mirror neuron, through experi-
ence in which the same action is simultaneously observed and
executed (20). If this theory is correct, it raises the possibility that
experience with nonmatching incentives “rewires” a part of the
mirror neuron system. For example, when players are rewarded
by winning the game after responding to an OPEN-HAND
gesture with a CLOSED-HAND gesture, this may strengthen
a new, excitatory link between a visual neuron coding hand
opening and a motor neuron coding hand closing. As a result,
the motor neuron would become responsive in some strategic
Fig. 2. Estimated intentional and automatic
responses, for early vs. late games. Probit regression
coefﬁcients ± 1 SE corresponding to probit regres-
sions with player ﬁxed-effects and SEs clustered at
the pair level.
























contexts to observation of one action and performance of a dif-
ferent action; in these contexts it would have “counter-mirror”
rather than “mirror” properties, and contribute to automatic
counter-imitation (22). Evidence that this kind of “rewiring” can
occur after a brief period of learning, comparable to that of the
present study, comes from studies detecting counter-mirror ac-
tivity in classic “mirror areas” of the brain using functional im-
aging (23) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (24).
Previous studies have indicated that automatic imitation, like
synchronous activity (25), can increase the probability that
players will cooperate in subsequent games (26, 27). Our results,
like Cook et al.’s, raise the possibility that under some circum-
stances choice can be involuntary, so that automatic imitation
can inﬂuence behavior in strategic contexts via an additional
route, by changing the structure of the game itself. If this theory
is correct, automatic imitation might override the incentive
constraints that in theory prevent cooperative outcomes in games
such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. In other possibilities, trading on
a ﬂoor with open outcry and imitable buy and sell gestures might
be more conducive to herding than an analogous electronic
market, thereby increasing volatility. At the broadest level, it is
noteworthy that this study not only used research in psychology
and neuroscience to cast light on the kinds of strategic inter-
actions that are of particular interest to economists, but also used
analytic techniques from economics to gain empirical traction on
a distinction—between automatic and intentional imitation—
that plays a key role in psychological theorizing. It therefore
underlines the mutual beneﬁt of combining methods and con-
cepts from neighboring social and natural sciences.
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Sighted player Incentives to
















Sighted player ﬁxed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observed 4,320 2,160 2,160 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
Probit regression coefﬁcients, with SEs in parentheses, clustered at the pair level. *, **, and *** indicates P values below 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
(one-tailed t test).
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